Source: The Trust Accounting Handbook (2025 Edition), Deborah J. Schaefer, CPA — LawPracticeCLE (50 pp).
Copied to: evidence/uncle_batch_2026-04-07/LPCLE_The_Trust_Accounting_Handbook_CM.pdf (verified: PDF v1.7, 50 pages).
Prepared for: Litman v. Goldberg, Index No. 524343/2025 (NY Sup. Ct., Kings Cty.) — Count V support memo.
Author note: Strategic memo only. Not a filing. Citations flagged [verify] need attorney confirmation before use.
The handbook is not a Louisiana/LPCLE product despite the filename. It is a national CLE course authored by Deborah J. Schaefer, CPA, published by LawPracticeCLE (FL), and is organized around ABA Model Rule 1.15 ("Safekeeping Property"). Every substantive section of the handbook (pp. 5–14) tracks the ABA Model Rule text verbatim, then walks through generic bookkeeping implementation.
CRITICAL CORRECTION (04/08/2026): Goldberg is NOT admitted in New York. He is admitted in Virginia and the District of Columbia. NGM is a DC entity. The prior version of this memo applied NY RPC 1.15 — that was wrong.
Governing authorities (three concurrent forums):
Why the handbook remains directly applicable: Virginia, DC, and USPTO all adopted rules substantially identical to ABA Model Rule 1.15. The handbook's ABA-based analysis applies with minimal modification to all three forums.
Related authorities across all three forums: - VA RPC 8.4(b)–(c) — criminal act reflecting adversely / dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation - DC RPC 8.4(b)–(c) — same - 37 CFR § 11.804(b)–(c) — same (USPTO OED analog) - 37 CFR § 11.804(h) — conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice before the USPTO
ABA ↔ VA / DC / USPTO concept map:
| Handbook concept (ABA Model Rule 1.15) | VA / DC / USPTO analog |
|---|---|
| 1.15(a) — separate account; 5-yr record retention | VA RPC 1.15(a); DC RPC 1.15(a); 37 CFR § 11.115(a) — separate account, 5-year retention (VA/DC/USPTO all follow ABA's 5-year standard) |
| 1.15(b) — lawyer's own funds only for bank charges | VA RPC 1.15(b); DC RPC 1.15(b); 37 CFR § 11.115(b) |
| 1.15(c) — advance fees/expenses into trust | VA RPC 1.15(c); DC RPC 1.15(c); 37 CFR § 11.115(c) |
| 1.15(d) — prompt notice, delivery, and "full accounting" on demand | VA RPC 1.15(d); DC RPC 1.15(d); 37 CFR § 11.115(d) |
| 1.15(e) — segregate disputed funds | VA RPC 1.15(e); DC RPC 1.15(e); 37 CFR § 11.115(e) |
| Required bookkeeping records (handbook p. 13–14) | VA and DC both require detailed trust records per their respective Rule 1.15; USPTO 37 CFR § 11.115 incorporates the same requirements |
| Three-way reconciliation (handbook p. 21) | Standard of care under all three forums — failure to reconcile is a hallmark of trust-account neglect |
| Commingling prohibition (handbook p. 12) | Per se violation under all three forums |
| Individual client ledger (handbook p. 12, 17, 22) | Required under all three forums — detailed records showing source, client names, amounts, disbursements |
| # | Handbook § (page) | VA / DC / USPTO Analog | Finding Proving Violation | Tier |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Individual client ledger required (pp. 12, 17) — "Must have detailed records for each client" | VA RPC 1.15(a); DC RPC 1.15(a); 37 CFR § 11.115(a) — detailed trust records per client | #51 — $9.89M in KFU deposits across 442 transactions never allocated to a client ledger | Per se |
| 2 | Batch deposits must identify client/matter (p. 15) | VA RPC 1.15(a); DC RPC 1.15(a); 37 CFR § 11.115(a) | #26 — wrong client-number deposits; #27 — renumbering scheme | Per se + aggravating (record falsification) |
| 3 | Prompt accounting on client request (handbook p. 8, Rule 1.15(d)) | VA RPC 1.15(d); DC RPC 1.15(d); 37 CFR § 11.115(d) — "promptly render a full accounting" | #19 ($16.2M accounting gap); #50 (July 2025 PAR suppressed 8 months); CN-37833 access refused (Finding #37) | Per se + aggravating |
| 4 | 5-year record retention (pp. 5, 13) | VA RPC 1.15(a); DC RPC 1.15(a); 37 CFR § 11.115(a) — 5-year retention | #19 ($16.2M gap); #50 (concealed PAR); #64 (all 69 reconciled transfers "Uncredited") | Per se |
| 5 | Commingling prohibited (p. 12) | VA RPC 1.15(a); DC RPC 1.15(a); 37 CFR § 11.115(a) | #26 — deposits under wrong client numbers bypassing allocation; #27 — alternate client numbers | Per se (disciplinary) |
| 6 | Trust funds must be in designated IOLTA/trust account in state of office (pp. 11–12) | VA RPC 1.15(b); DC RPC 1.15(b); 37 CFR § 11.115(b) — trust account requirements | #57 — BoA account 003926278751 identified as NGM trust account (need to confirm IOLTA-designated) | Aggravating |
| 7 | Three-way reconciliation — trust bank balance, client-ledger balance, check register must match (p. 21) | VA RPC 1.15(a); DC RPC 1.15(a); 37 CFR § 11.115(a) — reconciliation obligation | #64 — all 69 reconciled transfers marked "Uncredited"; #62 — Goldberg admission "invoice numbers not matching matter numbers" | Per se + fraud indicator |
| 8 | Complete records of all transactions, receipts AND disbursements (p. 12) | VA RPC 1.15(a); DC RPC 1.15(a); 37 CFR § 11.115(a) — complete trust records | #51 (442 missing allocations); #63 (2,457 KFU dockets without invoices = $1.02M) | Per se |
| 9 | Notify client promptly of funds received; deliver on demand (Rule 1.15(d), p. 8) | VA RPC 1.15(d); DC RPC 1.15(d); 37 CFR § 11.115(d) | #50 (July 2025 PAR held 8 months); #37 (CN-37833 access refused) | Aggravating |
| 10 | "Controls and procedures" / separation of duties (p. 47) — fiduciary standard | VA RPC 1.15 (fiduciary duties); DC RPC 1.15; 37 CFR § 11.115 — managing-member personal duty | #53 — Goldberg's June 11, 2025 written admission ("For KFU, you should clearly receive your percentage… I need to figure out why"); #66 — 20% formula known but not applied | Aggravating (personal liability) |
| Finding | Mapped Violation | VA / DC / USPTO Rule |
|---|---|---|
| #19 $16.2M accounting gap | Record retention + accounting on demand | VA RPC 1.15(d); DC RPC 1.15(d); 37 CFR § 11.115(d) |
| #26 Wrong client-number deposits | Commingling + misallocation + batch-deposit identification | VA RPC 1.15(a); DC RPC 1.15(a); 37 CFR § 11.115(a) |
| #27 Client renumbering scheme | Record falsification + fraud | VA RPC 1.15(a); DC RPC 1.15(a); VA/DC RPC 8.4(c); 37 CFR § 11.804(c) (dishonesty/fraud/misrepresentation) |
| #50 July 2025 PAR suppressed 8 months | Record retention + prompt accounting + active concealment | VA RPC 1.15(d); DC RPC 1.15(d); 37 CFR § 11.115(d); VA/DC RPC 8.4(c); 37 CFR § 11.804(c) |
| #51 $9.89M KFU unallocated / 442 txns | Individual client ledger requirement | VA RPC 1.15(a); DC RPC 1.15(a); 37 CFR § 11.115(a) |
| #57 BoA 003926278751 | Designated trust account | VA RPC 1.15(b); DC RPC 1.15(b); 37 CFR § 11.115(b) |
| #62 Goldberg written admission — invoice/matter mismatch | Individual ledger + reconciliation failure | VA RPC 1.15(a); DC RPC 1.15(a); 37 CFR § 11.115(a) |
| #63 2,457 KFU dockets without invoices ($1.02M) | Prompt accounting + records of disbursements | VA RPC 1.15(d); DC RPC 1.15(d); 37 CFR § 11.115(d) |
| #64 All 69 reconciled transfers "Uncredited" | Fraudulent record-keeping pattern / three-way reconciliation failure | VA RPC 1.15(a); DC RPC 1.15(a); VA/DC RPC 8.4(c); 37 CFR § 11.804(c) |
| #66 20% rule mechanically validated | Knowing failure to apply known formula — scienter for fraud | VA RPC 1.15(d); DC RPC 1.15(d); VA/DC RPC 8.4(c); 37 CFR § 11.804(c) |
Recommendation: YES — file in THREE forums, strategically timed.
CRITICAL CORRECTION (04/08/2026): Goldberg is NOT admitted in New York. He is admitted in DC and Virginia. The prior recommendation to file with the Brooklyn AGC was wrong. Goldberg has no NY bar membership for the AGC to exercise jurisdiction over. The correct forums are below.
Jurisdiction: Goldberg is Reg. 44126, a registered patent practitioner. OED has exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction over his patent practice.
Complaint mechanism: OED Director complaint form, available at https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/patent-and-trademark-practitioners/complaints-against-practitioners [verify URL current].
Rules to cite: - 37 CFR § 11.115(a) — commingling; failure to maintain trust records - 37 CFR § 11.115(b) — failure to maintain proper trust account - 37 CFR § 11.115(d) — failure to deliver funds / render accounting on demand - 37 CFR § 11.804(c) — dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation (renumbering scheme, 8-month PAR concealment) - 37 CFR § 11.804(h) — conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice before the USPTO
Why strongest: OED handles fewer complaints than state bars and tends to investigate more thoroughly. Trust accounting violations are taken extremely seriously. Suspension or exclusion from USPTO practice would directly impact Goldberg's ability to operate NGM's patent practice — far more consequential than state bar discipline.
Jurisdiction: Goldberg is a member of the Virginia State Bar.
Complaint mechanism: VSB disciplinary system — online complaint form at https://www.vsb.org [verify URL current].
Rules to cite: - VA RPC 1.15 — all safekeeping-property violations - VA RPC 8.4(b) — criminal act reflecting adversely on fitness - VA RPC 8.4(c) — dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation
Jurisdiction: Goldberg is admitted in DC; NGM is a DC entity.
Complaint mechanism: DC Office of Disciplinary Counsel.
Rules to cite: - DC RPC 1.15 — all safekeeping-property violations - DC RPC 8.4(b) — criminal act reflecting adversely on fitness - DC RPC 8.4(c) — dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation
Note on reciprocal discipline: Under DC Bar Rule XI, Section 11, a finding of misconduct in one jurisdiction (e.g., USPTO OED or Virginia) triggers presumptive reciprocal discipline in DC. Filing in all three forums simultaneously creates compounding pressure.
Important caveat: Trust accounting violations are the single most common category of attorney discipline across all jurisdictions, and disciplinary bodies treat commingling and record-keeping failures with unusual severity (suspension or disbarment are common even for negligent violations). Filing is low-cost and high-leverage. But the filing decision is the admitted attorney's call.
Viability under NY law: MAYBE — plausible but not automatic.
Under NY law, punitive damages in a civil action require conduct that is "morally culpable," "wanton," or "aimed at the public generally." The foundational authority is Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401 (1961) (punitives available in fraud where the conduct is part of "gross, wanton, or willful fraud" or aimed at the public generally).
For Count V (Civil Rights Law §§ 50–51) specifically: Section 51 expressly authorizes the jury to award "exemplary damages" where the defendant "knowingly used such person's name… in such manner as is forbidden or declared to be unlawful." N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 51 [verify exact quoted text]. That's the statutory hook — punitives are built into the cause of action; we do not need common-law Walker v. Sheldon to reach them.
How Rule 1.15 violations feed the § 51 exemplary-damages case: - They show knowing, systematic conduct — not inadvertence. - They show a pattern of concealment (active suppression of the July 2025 PAR, the renumbering scheme) — the hallmark of "morally culpable" conduct. - They show fiduciary betrayal — the aggravating factor NY courts repeatedly cite when awarding punitives against professionals. - They show personal participation by Goldberg — the managing-member admission (Finding #53) is a direct admission of knowledge.
Limits / things to acknowledge:
- Rule 1.15 violations are not themselves a private cause of action in NY. Shapiro v. McNeill, 92 N.Y.2d 91 (1998) [verify] holds that the disciplinary rules do not create private rights of action. They can, however, be used as evidence of the standard of care and as evidence of scienter.
- Punitive damages are not recoverable on a pure breach-of-contract claim, so the theory must be tied to the § 51 statutory claim (or to a tort claim, if one survives).
- I am NOT citing Ross v. Louise Wise Services or other cases the task mentioned — I want counsel to verify them before use.
Viability: YES — independent damages bucket, and supported by NY case law.
NY has a well-developed "faithless servant doctrine" (Murray v. Beard, 102 N.Y. 505 (1886); Feiger v. Iral Jewelry, Ltd., 41 N.Y.2d 928 (1977) [verify]; Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co., L.P., 344 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2003) [verify]). Under this doctrine, an agent who is disloyal to the principal forfeits all compensation during the period of disloyalty — regardless of whether the principal suffered measurable damages from the specific disloyal acts.
Applied here: - If Goldberg/NGM violated Rule 1.15 during a period when they were collecting fees keyed to Litman's name (attorney number 418, KFU matters, all 4patent.com-domain matters), the faithless-servant doctrine may authorize disgorgement of all fees collected during that period, not just Litman's 20% share. - Relevant periods: from the first documented trust violation (likely 2020–2021 based on Findings #19, #26) through the present. - The handbook is useful here because it frames the trust obligations as absolute, not as a fee-sharing dispute — which aligns the claim with fiduciary / faithless-servant theories rather than contract.
Damages math sketch (for counsel to stress-test): - $2,108,387 – $2,412,428 (NGM-produced fee totals, 22–24 mo) — baseline. - $9,886,482.87 (KFU deposits unallocated, Finding #51) — upper-bound dollar universe. - Disgorgement could theoretically reach 100% of fees collected on matters where Rule 1.15 was violated during the collection period, not merely Litman's 20% share.
Caveat: Faithless-servant is an agent/employee doctrine. Its application to a partner/managing-member relationship (Goldberg vs. Litman) is fact-dependent — counsel will need to confirm the correct framing.
Each Rule 1.15 record-retention violation creates a basis for a willful-spoliation adverse-inference instruction under CPLR 3126 and Pegasus Aviation I, Inc. v. Varig Logistica S.A., 26 N.Y.3d 543 (2015) [verify citation]. Requested instructions:
The handbook (pp. 13–17) enumerates what a Rule 1.15-compliant firm must keep. Every category below is a legitimate document demand under VA RPC 1.15, DC RPC 1.15, and 37 CFR § 11.115:
[verify] — Shapiro v. McNeill; Feiger; Phansalkar; Pegasus Aviation; Walker v. Sheldon — confirm citations before any use in filings.CORRECTION (04/08/2026): Uncle confirms that none of the client payments are "retainers." They are fixed-fee payments for defined patent prosecution work. NGM's trust ledgers systematically label these payments as "retainers."
Why this matters under VA/DC/USPTO trust rules:
The distinction between a retainer (advance payment for future, undefined services — must be held in trust until earned) and a fixed fee (payment for a defined scope of work — may be deposited to operating when paid, or after services rendered, depending on jurisdiction) is one of the most heavily litigated trust-accounting issues in attorney discipline.
What NGM did wrong: 1. Mislabeling fixed fees as "retainers" — By calling fixed-fee payments "retainers" on trust ledgers, NGM created the appearance that these funds were properly held in trust pending earning. But if these were fixed fees (as uncle confirms), the trust-accounting rules apply differently: the funds either should have been deposited to operating (if earned on receipt) or should have been tracked against defined deliverables (if earned incrementally). The "retainer" label obscures which regime applies — and obscures what is owed to Litman as the responsible attorney.
VA RPC 1.15; DC RPC 1.15; 37 CFR § 11.115 — the mislabeling itself is a trust-record-keeping violation because the records do not accurately reflect the nature, source, and status of the funds.
Aggravating factor for damages: The mischaracterization made it impossible for Litman to determine what he was owed — fixed fees earned by "attorney number 418" work would flow to his 20% immediately upon earning, but "retainers" held in trust could be delayed indefinitely. The label gave NGM cover to defer (or never make) the allocation.
Pattern evidence: The mischaracterization is consistent with the other record-falsification findings (client renumbering scheme, Finding #27; "Uncredited" transfers, Finding #64; invoice/matter mismatch, Finding #62). It is not an isolated labeling error but part of a systematic pattern of making trust records unreliable.
NEW ANGLE (04/08/2026): If Goldberg is practicing law from Brooklyn, New York, while admitted only in DC and Virginia, that is a potential unauthorized practice of law violation.
Key facts: - Goldberg's managing-member admission (Finding #29): "I will continue managing the firm as I have been" — sent from Brooklyn (June 15, 2021). - KSU disbursement signed from Brooklyn (Finding #59, April 4, 2023). - NGM's Brooklyn office is where Goldberg conducts day-to-day operations. - Goldberg is not admitted in New York.
Legal framework: - NY Judiciary Law § 478 — makes it a misdemeanor for a person not admitted in NY to practice law or hold themselves out as entitled to practice law in NY. - NY Judiciary Law § 484 — prohibits any natural person from practicing law in NY without being admitted. - UPL in NY is not reported to the AGC (which only has jurisdiction over admitted attorneys). It is reportable to: - The NY Attorney General (authorized to seek injunctive relief under Judiciary Law § 476-a) - The NY courts directly (inherent power to enjoin UPL) - The local District Attorney (misdemeanor prosecution)
How this strengthens the case: - It is an independent basis for personal liability — Goldberg cannot hide behind NGM if he was not even authorized to practice law in the jurisdiction where he was operating. - It reinforces the "consciousness of wrongdoing" narrative — Goldberg was operating an entire law firm from a state where he had no license. - It creates additional leverage for settlement — a UPL complaint is a criminal referral, not merely a disciplinary one. - It interacts with the POA signatures: if Goldberg was not authorized to practice in NY, every POA he signed from Brooklyn may have been signed without authority.
Caveat: UPL analysis depends on whether Goldberg's activities in Brooklyn constitute "practicing law in New York" versus managing a DC firm remotely. Counsel should evaluate whether the safe harbors in NY case law (e.g., temporary practice, in-house counsel exceptions) apply. The strongest argument is that signing POAs, managing client matters, signing disbursement checks, and holding himself out as managing member of a firm with a Brooklyn office goes well beyond what any safe harbor covers.
End of analysis.