ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED / ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT INTERNAL STRATEGY MEMO — DO NOT DISTRIBUTE OUTSIDE CASE TEAM
Prepared: April 7, 2026 Prepared for: Richard C. Litman and his trial counsel Subject: Tiered settlement valuation, negotiating leverage, and recommended demand posture in light of the discovery demands now teed up for enforcement Surviving claim: Count V — N.Y. Civil Rights Law §§ 50–51 (misappropriation of name)
The purpose of this memo is to translate the evidentiary record built since March 2026 into a defensible internal valuation of the case for settlement purposes, and to identify the leverage points that will move Goldberg's side off its current "judgment-proof posture." It is not a demand letter, an MSJ brief, or a damages declaration — it is the negotiating playbook that sits behind those documents.
The thesis is straightforward:
The case has a hard floor of approximately $2.27M in numbers Goldberg's own records and his own counsel's productions establish, and the discovery demands we have just built will, with high probability, expand the documented base by another $1M–$2.5M before any § 51 statutory or punitive layer is applied. Once those layers are added, the realistic trial value sits in the $11M–$30M range, and any settlement should be priced accordingly.
The single most important observation for negotiating posture is this: every dollar in Tier 1 and Tier 2 below comes from documents Goldberg himself produced or generated. Goldberg cannot dispute his own spreadsheets, his own Payment Allocation PDFs, or the wires his own counsel (Aaron Gould of Connell Foley) reconciled in the Q4 2025 production. The floor is not contested; it is admitted in writing.
| Component | Amount | Source |
|---|---|---|
| KFU unpaid 20% (Jan 2023 – Nov 2024 trust deposits, 98.4% PDF-authenticated against produced 36372 ledger) | $1,977,000 | KFU_PDF_AUTHENTICATION_MEMO § 4 — aggregate match $9,886,482.87 PDF vs $9,730,316.57 ledger |
| May–Jun 2025 confirmed unpaid (PDF shows amount owed; no paid line) + Jan 2025 residual | $49,386 | Payment Allocation PDFs 6/13/2025 and 7/2/2025; VARIANCE_DAMAGES_MODEL § V.A |
| Q4 2025 owed per Aaron Gould (Connell Foley) production 1/23/2026 | $246,628 | Counsel-produced workup; Q4 2025 Reconciliation |
| Tier 1 SUBTOTAL | ≈ $2,273,014 |
Why this is the floor: Every figure has been produced, accepted, or generated by Goldberg's own side. No subpoena, no forensic accountant, no discovery battle is required to put any of these numbers in front of a jury. Walk-away below this line is not a settlement — it is a gift to the defense.
| Component | Amount | Source |
|---|---|---|
| May–Dec 2025 confirmed shortfall (Goldberg's own monthly figures, no payment evidence post-5/21/2025) | $411,699 | VARIANCE_DAMAGES_MODEL § V.C base case |
| Jul–Sep 2023 spreadsheet-only reporting period (3 months, no contemporaneous PDFs) | $345,344 | VARIANCE_DAMAGES_MODEL § III Tier 2 |
| Uncredited invoices + MSRDC trust-only | $85,974 | VARIANCE_DAMAGES_MODEL § IV.D |
| KSU Litman 20% owed (per KFU/KSU forensic financial map) | $781,862 | KFU/KSU forensic data; KSU 2020–2025 billings |
| Renumbered clients — documented diverted 20% (9 institutional + smaller) | $3,810,136 | CLIENT_RENUMBERING_SCHEME_EXHIBIT § 4.1 totals |
| Tier 2 SUBTOTAL (incl. Tier 1 floor) | ≈ $5.85M – $7.7M depending on overlap netting |
Why this matters in negotiation: Tier 2 is where Goldberg's side will fight hardest, because the renumbering damages depend on the trust-vs-operating gap theory. But every line item in Tier 2 is sourced to a document already in our possession or already produced by them. We do not need new discovery to put Tier 2 on the board — we only need to argue it. The discovery demands we have built are insurance, not necessity.
These numbers are not yet on the board but will materialize as the discovery demands are enforced. Each is rated for probability and expected magnitude.
| Component | Probability | Expected Yield | Trigger |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aug–Sep 2025 Payment Allocation Reports (presumptively exist per Concealment Timeline; recovered Jul 2025 PDF establishes pattern) | 95% | $109K (20%) + $40K+/mo fee-credit allocation differential — likely $250K–$500K once fee-credit reframed | Compelled production / spoliation motion |
| Soluno transaction-level KFU export (the "442 transactions" subledger) | 85% | Likely expands the $9.89M KFU base by 5–15% in additional unallocated deposits → +$100K–$300K to RCL 20% | Document demand + motion to compel |
| Soluno admin audit logs (originating-attorney code changes; client-renumbering audit trail) | 70% | Quantifies the renumbering scheme and converts $3.81M from "asserted" to "proven" → swings probability of recovery from ~40% to ~80% | Document demand + Goldberg deposition |
| Eagle Bank / BoA bank statement subpoena (wires post-5/21/2025) | 90% | Confirms zero payments to Litman post-Apr 2025; quantifies actual wire activity through CN-37833 | Third-party subpoena |
Microsoft 365 audit logs (nathlaw.onmicrosoft.com / 4patent.com accepted domain) |
75% | Mailbox creation dates for 50 aliases; sign-in audit; alias-to-mailbox redirections — converts the @4patent.com alias system from circumstantial to instrumented | Document demand |
| KFU sub-trust ledgers for the four FAIL months (Aug 2023, May/Jun/Sep 2024) | 80% | Recovers the $653K gap (~$130K Litman 20%) | Document demand |
| Jan–Mar 2026 monthly reports (no figures produced at all) | 95% | Estimated $200K–$400K in collected fees; $40K–$80K in 20% accruing | Continuing damages demand |
| Tier 3 EXPECTED YIELD (range) | +$1.0M – $2.5M |
Strategic note: The Concealment Timeline (recovered July 2025 PDF, 8-month delay) is the single highest-leverage discovery instrument we hold. It transforms every withheld monthly report from a hypothetical document into a known, dated, generated business record being deliberately withheld. The recovered fee-credit number ($40,768.39 for July 2025 alone — more than 6x the 20% figure) is the negotiation grenade: if it holds across the gap, the per-month damages are an order of magnitude larger than the 20% base.
NY Civil Rights Law § 51 permits compensatory damages and, where the use was knowing, exemplary damages. The "deck of cards" theory adopted in this case treats every distinct commercial use as a separate § 51 publication.
| Counting Theory | Units | Per-Unit | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| 905 patents × nominal floor | 905 | $1,000 | $905,000 |
| 905 patents × typical jury award | 905 | $5,000 | $4,525,000 |
| 905 patents × aggressive (jurisdictionally supported on attorney-name cases) | 905 | $10,000 | $9,050,000 |
| Plus 17,000+ outgoing USPTO documents bearing the name (each a separate publication) | ~17,000 | $100–$500 | $1.7M – $8.5M |
| Plus 205,597 emails through @4patent.com aliases (each a separate "use") | ~205,000 | $5–$25 | $1.0M – $5.1M |
| Tier 4 RANGE | $5M – $30M+ |
The "deck of cards" theory is aggressive but supported by both the surviving Count V framework and Goldberg's own admissions in his Answer (¶¶ 32, 72) that Litman's name appeared on patent front pages and the website after 6/15/2020. Each appearance is a separate § 51 act.
Punitive / exemplary damages under § 51 require a showing of knowing or wanton conduct. The record supports the multiplier on five independent grounds:
Recommended multiplier band: 1.5x to 5x applied to the Tier 1–3 base.
Hard to quantify but supports an additional 1.0–2.0x multiplier on the Tier 1–3 base. Key supports:
The existing Point III brief frames damages in the $6.1M – $77.9M range, calibrated to the alternative § 51 theories (per-patent, per-publication, fee-credit allocation, and trust-to-operating gap audit). This is the published trial-value envelope.
| Position | Floor | Conservative | Aggressive | Justification |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Walk-away | $2.27M | $3.0M | $3.5M | Tier 1 alone — Goldberg's own admitted numbers. Anything less concedes his own records. |
| Counsel's recommended demand | $8.5M | $12M | $16M | Tier 1 + Tier 2 + midpoint Tier 3 + 1.5x–2.5x willfulness multiplier. Achievable on the existing record without trial. |
| Opening demand | $18M | $22M | $30M | Tier 1–4 combined with 2x–3x willfulness multiplier. Anchored to MSJ Point III upper-mid range. Leaves room to compromise. |
| Trial value (realistic, jury verdict) | $11M | $22M | $45M | Tier 1–4 combined, mid-multiplier. Excludes tail risk of jury punitive overshoot. |
| Trial value (upper jurisdictional ceiling) | $30M | $50M | $77.9M | Per MSJ Point III published range; assumes per-publication theory plus 5x punitive. |
Recommended target settlement window: $9M – $14M. This window: - Comfortably exceeds Tier 1+2 (cannot be characterized as undervaluing the admitted numbers) - Captures roughly 50% of expected trial value at 100% certainty - Discounts trial value by litigation cost, time-to-judgment, collection risk, and tail uncertainty - Stays within Goldberg's likely insurance + personal liquidity envelope (preserving collectability) - Sits below the MSJ Point III lower bound ($6.1M) only to the extent of compromise — i.e., it asks Goldberg to pay slightly more than the lowest published number we will argue, not less
Recommended opening demand: $22M. This anchors negotiation high enough that the natural compromise lands inside the target window, while remaining defensible by reference to a single sentence in the MSJ Point III brief.
These are the points to lead with in any mediation, settlement conference, or pre-trial outreach. Each is independently devastating; together they are overwhelming.
The recovered July 2025 Payment Allocation Report. One document. Generated 8/11/2025. Withheld until 4/7/2026. Proves active concealment, not spoliation, and anchors the adverse-inference theory for 8+ subsequent months. Walk into mediation with this PDF on the table.
The 98.4% KFU authentication. Litman's $9.89M / $1.98M figures reproduce against Goldberg's own produced trust ledger to within 1.6%. The defense cannot claim Litman's numbers are fabricated — they trace cleanly to the documents Goldberg produced.
The 75% renumbered/aliased double-overlay. Front end (50 aliases on Litman's personal domain, 73% of all non-personal traffic on 9 institutional clients) and back end (20 renumbered clients, $3.81M in diverted 20%) are coextensive. The probability of this being coincidence is functionally zero.
The 8-month reporting delay across the litigation-threat inflection point. Stage 1 (contemporaneous, Oct 2023 – Jun 2025): 21 monthly reports, ~12.5 day average delay. Stage 3 (concealment, Jul 2025 – present): zero delivered. The dividing line is 7/17/2025 (litigation threat) → 7/18/2025 (email elimination) → 7/2/2025 (last contemporaneous report). Three events, three days. Causation is undeniable.
Judicial estoppel. Goldberg's prior arbitration position (agreement terminated 6/15/2020) is irreconcilable with his current Answer position (same agreement authorizes name use). The arbitrator accepted his prior position. He cannot now reverse it without admitting to playing fast and loose with the courts.
The OpenGov "Joshua Goldberg litman@4patent.com" registration (9/2/2025). Six weeks after the email elimination, Goldberg used Litman's personal professional email address as his own. This single fact proves: (a) the account was seized, not destroyed; (b) Goldberg retained operational access; (c) the misappropriation is literal and ongoing.
The Q4 2025 reconciliation produced by Goldberg's own counsel. $1,233,141 in collected fees on Litman-originated matters in a single quarter, $246,628 owed. This number was produced under counsel's signature. It cannot be repudiated.
Three clients drawn by name in the same period (Bennington, Albannai, Dvorkin). Direct proof that Litman's name was the commercial draw, that Goldberg knew it was the draw, and that Goldberg continued using it.
The 16 personally signed POAs. Goldberg's own signature, his own registration number (44126), placing Litman's name on patent filings as recently as January 17, 2025. The mechanism of liability is documented, not inferred.
Bar grievance / BBO complaint risk. Active concealment of monthly business records by an attorney admitted to practice is a disciplinary matter independent of civil liability. A § 1200 New York Rules of Professional Conduct referral is a one-page filing with potentially career-ending consequences. Settlement extinguishes the civil case but does not extinguish disciplinary exposure unless paired with an explicit non-disclosure provision — and even that is unenforceable against the grievance committee. The threat of referral is real and uncomfortable.
Professional liability insurance. Goldberg signed the firm's malpractice application on 7/6/2021 listing Litman as "Of Counsel." That representation, combined with the post-SOL conduct, may itself be a misrepresentation in the policy application. Renewal premiums after a public verdict will be punitive; coverage may be denied outright. Settlement before public adjudication preserves insurability.
KFU and KSU client risk. KFU is the dominant revenue driver — $11.76M in 2023–2024 collected fees, ~94% of Litman-originated revenue. Once the facts of this case are public (renumbering, $0 reported, alias system), KFU has every reason to demand an audit, change firms, or claw back funds. The same is true of KSU, Kuwait University, KISR, UAEU, and Sabah Al-Ahmad. Settlement under confidentiality preserves the client base; trial detonates it.
Partner relationships. Howard Kline (trademark practice), Ilirian Durri (operating from Goldberg's home address), and others at NGM are exposed to the same factual record. A public verdict creates internal partner dispute risk and potential cross-claims. Settlement contains the damage to one defendant.
Personal asset exposure. The veil-piercing finding by Judge Maslow on 12/05/2025 (citing Turane v. MGN, LLC) means a Count V judgment runs against Goldberg personally, not just NGM. NGM owns the office building; Goldberg is a personal guarantor on at least one life insurance policy. A judgment can attach.
The MSJ exposure. Point III alone ($6.1M – $77.9M range) is being briefed now. Once the MSJ is filed, the published damages range becomes the public anchor. Settlement before MSJ filing keeps the number off the docket.
Discovery cost asymmetry. Each motion to compel we file forces Goldberg's side to either produce the records (which damage him) or fight (which costs him). Connell Foley's hourly rate is the second meter running against him. Settlement caps the spend.
Insurance is paying for the defense. If malpractice carrier is funding Connell Foley, Goldberg's marginal cost of continued litigation is low. This is the strongest argument against settlement. Counter: even insured defense terminates at policy limits, and the punitive damages exposure is almost certainly not covered.
Ego. Goldberg has held an inflexible position throughout (denial in Answer, refusal of CN-37833 access, deposition no-show on 2/24). Capitulation costs him face. Mitigant: a confidentiality clause and a no-admission provision can preserve face while extracting value.
Judgment-proof posture (asserted). Goldberg has signaled — through counsel and through conduct — that he is not in a position to pay a large judgment. This is partially true and partially negotiating posture. NGM owns the building; the firm has insurance; Goldberg has a salary. The collectability discount is real but not 100%.
Hope of MSJ failure / dismissal. Goldberg's side may believe they can still get Count V dismissed on a federal preemption or single-publication theory. Both are addressed in MSJ Point IV and V; both are weak. But the hope itself delays settlement.
Time pressure favors him. Each month of delay accrues damages on our side but bleeds Litman's litigation budget on the other. Settlement timing should not signal urgency on our part.
| Phase | Window | Recommended Demand | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-deposition (now – 6/2/2026) | Pre-discovery enforcement | $9M – $11M | Lowest acceptable; Goldberg gets the discount of avoiding deposition exposure and the recovered-July-2025 deposition exhibit going on the record. Best window for him. |
| Post-deposition / pre-MSJ (Jun – Sep 2026) | Discovery enforced; deposition transcript in hand | $12M – $16M | After Goldberg testifies under oath about the recovered July 2025 PDF, the 16 POAs, and the OpenGov registration, his settlement leverage collapses. |
| Post-MSJ briefing (Sep – Dec 2026) | Damages range publicly briefed | $18M – $25M | The MSJ Point III range ($6.1M – $77.9M) is now docket-published. Anchor moves up. |
| Pre-trial / on the courthouse steps (Jan – Feb 2027) | Note of Issue 2/5/2027 | $22M – $30M | Maximum leverage; minimum time for Goldberg to absorb the verdict risk. |
| Mid-trial | Jury sworn | $30M+ | Verdict risk maximized; collectability risk also maximized. |
Optimal settlement window for Litman: post-deposition, pre-MSJ. This is the moment when (a) Goldberg has testified and cannot retract; (b) the recovered July 2025 PDF and 16 POAs are authenticated on the record; (c) the MSJ damages range is not yet public, so Goldberg's insurer has not yet adjusted reserves upward; and (d) Litman has the most usable evidence at the lowest marginal cost.
MSJ Point I (Liability + Judicial Estoppel) — partial summary judgment on liability. The Answer admissions, the 16 POAs, and the judicial estoppel argument should support partial summary judgment on liability for at least a subset of the 905 patents (the 21 mapped exemplars at minimum). This converts the trial to a damages-only proceeding.
Spoliation motion — adverse inference instruction. Already drafted (MOTION_SPOLIATION_SANCTIONS.md). File on or shortly after Goldberg deposition. Adverse inference at trial reframes every concealed monthly report as presumptively damaging.
Per-publication damages theory. Brief and argue the "deck of cards" theory at MSJ. Even partial acceptance multiplies the per-patent base by an order of magnitude.
Bifurcated trial — liability first, then damages. If the court is hesitant on the punitive multiplier, push for bifurcation. Liability is overwhelming; damages can be argued separately to a second jury phase.
Continuing damages. Damages are not historical — they are accruing at ~$76,427/month. Note of Issue date (2/5/2027) is 10 months out; that is another ~$764,000 in continuing 20% damages alone, before willfulness multipliers. The trial backup posture should expressly preserve continuing damages.
Disciplinary referral. If settlement fails entirely, file the bar complaint contemporaneously with trial. The disciplinary process and the civil process can run in parallel, and findings in either feed the other.
Federal forum re-entry. The voluntarily dismissed federal Lanham Act case (1:25-cv-04048, EDNY) can be refiled if the state action does not produce adequate relief. The trademark evidence (245 unique dockets, TUFFKOTE ITU abandonment, LITMAN LAW OFFICES owned by Nath & Associates) is independently actionable.
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| What is the floor below which we should not settle? | $2.27M (Tier 1 only — Goldberg's own admitted numbers) |
| What is the realistic settlement window? | $9M – $14M pre-deposition; $12M – $16M post-deposition |
| What is our opening demand? | $22M (anchored to MSJ Point III mid-range, leaves room to compromise) |
| What is the realistic trial value? | $11M – $30M (Tier 1–4 plus mid willfulness multiplier) |
| What is the published upper bound? | $77.9M (MSJ Point III) |
| What is the highest-leverage discovery instrument we hold? | The recovered July 2025 Payment Allocation Report (anchors active concealment theory and 8 additional months by direct analogy) |
| What is the optimal settlement timing? | Post-deposition, pre-MSJ (Jun – Sep 2026) |
| What is the worst-case downside of trial? | A defense verdict on Count V, which is improbable given the Answer admissions and the 16 POAs. Even a low jury award likely exceeds $3M based on Tier 1 alone. |
| What is the worst-case downside of accepting a low settlement? | Forfeiting the willfulness multiplier and the discovery yield expansion (Tiers 3–5). On the existing record, that forfeit is in the $6M – $20M range. |
The case is not a coin flip. The hard floor is admitted by Goldberg's own documents. The discovery demands now in motion will expand that floor by another $1M–$2.5M with high probability. The willfulness record is overwhelming. The judicial estoppel is on the record. The veil-piercing finding is already in place.
Recommended posture: open at $22M, target $12M–$14M, do not settle below $9M, and walk to trial below $6M.
The case should not settle for less than the value of what we already have on paper. It should not be tried for less than the value of what we will have after enforcement. The window between those two numbers is approximately $10M, and that window is the negotiation.
Prepared April 7, 2026 for internal case-team use. This memo is attorney work product and is not to be disclosed outside the case team. All numerical figures derive from the source documents cited and from prior memos in the output/ directory. Counsel and client should review and adjust the recommended demand levels in light of mediation posture, insurance information, and any additional facts developed in discovery.
Rule (per Richard Litman, 04/16/2026): For matters on which NGM has failed to produce accounting records — including the Aug/Sep 2025 Payment Allocation Reports, the $9.89M/442-transaction KFU unallocated universe, and any other matter where NGM's production omits the billed amount — damages are to be calculated using the following baseline, which supplements (does not replace) the seven-tier valuation stack in § II:
C2051472_ND0000271385; Martha Long fee quotes in the email corpus; engagement-letter schedules).Why this matters to the leverage analysis: The fee baseline provides a per-patent floor that survives NGM's concealment strategy. Even if Defendants succeed in suppressing additional monthly reports, bank records, or docket-level billing, the 905-patent universe × $15K–$20K produces a $13.6M – $18.1M aggregate fee base independent of the produced accounting — of which Litman's 20% share is $2.7M – $3.6M. This figure (a) sits squarely between Tier 2 and Tier 3 on the existing stack; (b) is not contingent on any further discovery yield; and (c) can be asserted without waiting for the Aug/Sep 2025 reports or the BoA subpoena return. Plaintiff is not penalized for defense suppression; the quoted pricing applies to the matters on which it was offered.
The fee baseline reinforces the recommended demand posture in § III without displacing it:
C2051472_ND0000271385) to move from $15K–$20K range to client-specific rates where supported.